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The Logical Status of Phyical Probability Assertions
by Joseph F. Johnson
In this paper we offer a definitive solution to the major problem in that part of
the philosophy of probability which is primarily logical, the question of the meaning of
probability. We abstract severely from all epistemological considerations, we do not adopt
a positivistic approach, and the applications to the problems of quantum mechanics are
dealt with separately in another paper1 using the earlier approach of von Plato2 instead of
the present approach. This approach as well as von Plato’s seems to allow one to solve
the problem of scientific induction as well, this is reserved for an intended sequel. It is
well known that each of the three main rival theories of the meaning of probability, the
frequency theory, the Keynesian theory, and the de Finetti-Savage (‘making book’) theory,
have fatal drawbacks3 and so there is literally no consensus among philosophers as to the
status of this problem. (That decades later Kolmogoroff went off on a tangent and evolved
his own idiosyncratic theory of the logical status of probability statements is beside the
point.)
In particular the attempt to analyze the logical structure of either propositions as-
serting probability or propositions “asserted” probabilistically, has not met with the same
1 ‘Thermodynamic Limits, Non-commutative Probability, and Quantum Entanglement’
in, Quantum Theory and Symmetries III, Cincinnati 2003, ed. by Argyres et al, Singapore,
2004, pp.133-143.
2 “Ergodic Theory,” in Skyrms, Harper, eds., Causation, Chance, and Credence, Pro-
ceedings of the Irvine Conference on Probability and Causation, 1985 vol. 1, Dordrecht,
1988 pp. 257-277.
3 For example, the frequency theory has been acutely criticised by Kolmogoroff in his
contributed chapter to Aleksandrov, Kolmogorov, and Lavrent’ev, ed.s, Mathematics its
content, Methods, and Meaning, 2nd ed., Moscow, 1956, we cite from a Cold War trans-
lation published in 1963 in Cambridge, Mass., p. 239, “ . . . it is clear that this procedure
will never allow us to be free of the necessity, at the last stage, of referring to probabilities
in the primitive imprecise sense of this term.”
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success as, say, Frege and Russell’s (or Wittgenstein’s) analysis of the propositions of math-
ematical logic (or physical science). The aim of this paper is to show that this is because
the analysis is not in the least parallel. We will propose a logical analysis of probability
assertions which takes its cue from recent developments in statistical mechanics and de-
terministic chaos. Therefore, assertions of the probability of a state of affairs are to be
unpacked as having reference to an (implicit) approximative model of reality—in contrast
to normal propositions, which refer to reality directly. This view is almost forced on one if
one recasts the mathematical physics of today on statistical mechanics into the framework
of Russell-Whitehead and Bourbaki.
We will accomplish this by taking into account Kolmogoroff’s critique of the logical
circularity of the frequency theory, otherwise the most attractive candidate. We can remove
this circularity by passing to the limit, but of course we recognise that ‘limit’ is not a word
with precise meaning in general, so we have to specify what kind of limit. Kolmogoroff’s
critique1 can be met by the Darwin-Fowler concept of the thermodynamic limit.
The philosophy of probability has many aspects, but we choose to focus on the phi-
losophy of science and probability within the realm of its usage in physics. This paper
will concentrate on the purely logical problem of the meaning of a statement that such
and such physical event’s occurrence has, had, or will have, probability x where x is a real
number in between 0 and 1. We will abstract from all epistemological questions and all
questions of what is the use of such a statement, except that a few remarks will imme-
1 op. cit., p. 253f., he remarks about vague talk of limits, “Such definitions roughly
correspond to the ‘definition’ in geometry of a point as the result of trimming down a
physical body an infinite number of times, each time decreasing its diameter by a factor
of 2.”
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diately follow from our solution of the purely logical problem of meaning. This seems to
solve the problem of induction (following Wiener’s ideas about induction and his theory
of prediction).1
The point of this paper is to completely subsume the meaning of such a statement
within the Russell-Wittgenstein, Bourbaki framework of mathematical logic as applied to
physical science. This is reductionist, but it works. All the usual scientific uses of the
concept of probability and all the mathematical theorems about it are validated by this
philosophical interpretation, obviously a desideratum of any such, and no new philosophical
concepts or difficulties are raised: the fatal criticisms of frequentism are remedied.
Now I wish to emphasize that the point of this paper is to successfully complete
an experiment. Can a purely deterministic, classically logical, reduction of the notion
of probability be made? This requires a rather severe focus. Only immanent objections
are relevant to this question, which is not exactly the same as the question of whether
this account of the meaning of probability is ‘true.’ Of course it has to account for the
uses made of it in science and apply to individual events, or else it is not the ‘notion of
probability.’ This said, success along these lines renders the rival theories rather pointless:
historically, their motivation was always the perceived failures of such experiments as this
one.
Of the three main rivals, and other less important theories, as to the logical meaning
of probability statements,the frequency theory is the most attractive but the most logically
1 Wiener, Extrapolation, Interpolation, and Smoothing of Stationary Time Series With
Engineering Applications, p. 47: “This allows us to identify averages made on the ob-
servable past of a time series with averages to be subsequently obtained from the now
unattainable future . . . It is this step which constitutes the logical process of induction.”
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flawed. Nevertheless, it will be our starting point since most scientists go ahead and use
it without worrying about its problems, and this paper will, in a way, justify that. The
frequency theory is, of course, incapable of being stated coherently without involving a
logical vicious circle, as Kolmogoroff famously pointed out. I would like to call this the
Rosencrantz and Guildenstern effect, after the opening scene of Tom Stoppard’s play.
Rosencrantz, or perhaps it was Guildenstern, opens the play by tossing a fair coin
sixty-four, or perhaps it was sixty-five, times in a row and getting the same result—heads,
or perhaps it was tails—every time (but the last). The probability that any given toss
gives a given result is one-half. The probability that the play-opening tosses-event would
occur is small but positive. Evidently the meaning of the statement ‘the probability that
this coin yields heads is fifty per cent.’ does not imply that the frequency with which heads
occurs in any finite set of trials will be anything in particular. This is a problem with the
frequency theory. It is circular to say that nevertheless, it asserts that the probability
that the expected frequency will be attained or departed from is what the calculus of
probabilities allows us to calculate it to be, because this involves an endless regress. It is
simply false, due to mathematical ignorance, to assert that in an infinite number of trials
the frequency will definitely be fifty per cent., because an infinite number of trials gives us
an infinite probability space, in fact a continuum of possibilities, and so events with zero
probability are not impossible. It is entirely possible that every toss of an infinite sequence
of tosses of a fair coin (conceding the physical meaningfulness of this for argument’s sake)
will be heads. To bring up its probability is again a circular regress.
Of course there is some validity to the intuition that, ‘in the limit’ the expected fre-
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quency will be obtained and that this is what we mean when we say that the probability
that a toss will be heads is one-half. But as we saw above, it does not mean that it is
impossible that the expected frequency will fail to obtain, and further, no one has sat-
isfactorily defined what sort of limit. The word limit has no physical or mathematical
meaning in isolation. There are various kinds of limits, one for each context, and they
have various properties. This paper will remedy the problem identified by Kolmogoroff,
the Rosencrantz and Guildenstern effect, and will give a logically well-defined meaning to
the intuition ‘in the limit’ by introducing the logically rigourous treatment of the ther-
modynamic limit pioneered by Darwin and Fowler,1 and applied to Brownian motion by
Wiener and Kolmogoroff, as exposited in the book by Khintchine, The Mathematical Foun-
dations of Statistical Mechanics, New York, 1949. There are some similarities to a proposed
theory of the meaning of probability by Professor Jan von Plato2 of Helsinki University,
and there are some similarities to one of the many contradictory proposals thrown out by
Aristotle in his discussions of chance and happenstance. Probability statements require
to be unpacked in a way analogous to Russell’s famous theory of descriptions, but vastly
more complicatedly, and we will argue that their logical structure is quite deeper than their
superficial grammar. This means that ‘probability,’ like ‘variable’ and ‘the’ is a linguistic
artifact or facon de parler, and the statements in which it occurs can always be unpacked
into unstraightforward but reducible determinate statements about the physical world.
It is well known from classical statistical mechanics, especially the theory of Brownian
1 Fowler, Statistical Mechanics, Cambridge, 1929.
2 “Ergodic Theory,” in Skyrms, Harper, eds., Causation, Chance, and Credence, Pro-
ceedings of the Irvine Conference on Probability and Causation, 1985 vol. 1, Dordrecht,
1988 pp. 257-277.
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motion1 that stochastic models are useful approximations to deterministic models: indeed,
the one can approximate the other to within any desired degree of approximation, so
that experimentally they are indistinguishable. The logic of approximate statements, i.e.,
propositions that such and such a quantity is definitely inside a precise and determinate
range of possibilities, is unglamourous precisely because nothing new except measure the-
ory is introduced into philosophy or science, but it proves sufficient to answer all the puzzles
about probability. Indeed, such approximate statements are simply precise propositions
on the same logical footing as the usual propositions about points and exact equalities,
and this has always been felt. (The dictionary definition of ‘centum’ includes such an ap-
proximate meaning quite explicitly: when, too, we talk in round numbers, this convention
is understood. There is nothing new or revolutionary here and no changes in classical logic
are required.) Then, too, the fact that the calculus of probabilities has already been suc-
cessfully incorporated within the classical mathematical logic without any changes needed
is a sort of omen that the philosophy might follow the same course.
One of Aristotle’s many suggestions about happenstance is that it arises when one
deterministic system interacts with another deterministic system and there exists no over-
arching combined system which keeps track of the interaction terms and is deterministic.
Evidently he was not familiar with Jacobi’s work on dynamics. Ever since Jacobi’s time,
a revolutionary change in our attitude to combined systems had occurrred. It used to
be taken for granted that one could not unify all systems into an overarching dynamic.
But Jacobi’s work showed that in mechanics, at least, one could practically formalise the
1 Heims, Steve, John von Neumann and Norbert Wiener: From Mathematics to the
Technologies of Life and Death, Cambridge, Mass., 1980, pp. 72-78 is a nice popularisation.
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process. Slowly the belief in a grand unified theory has taken over the physical sciences
because of the compelling vision that there will always be an interaction term which takes
it all into account.
Nevertheless, there is one barrier which must remain: the interaction between an in-
dividual particle, such as the dust mote in Brownian motion, and a Hamiltonian heatbath,
must be resistant to this Jacobian imperative: the heatbath is not a dynamical system at
all, but is a thermodynamic limit. The barrier between the finite and the infinite clearly
marks off the realm of dynamics from another realm. For two reasons: firstly, a finite
system is a dynamical system in the technical sense of the word: there is a symplectic
phase space as is usual in Hamiltonian mechanics, Liouville measure, invariant under the
dynamical flow of states, etc. But even though physicists have various ad hoc ways of math-
ematically modelling infinite systems, they are not dynamical systems in the same sense.
Secondly and more important from a logical point of view (since after all one could wonder
whether the first, technical barrier could not be overcome by suitable generalisation of the
definition of dynamical system), ‘the’ thermodynamic limit is not an object. The logically
rigourous treatment of the process of ‘passing to the thermodynamic limit’ (below) shows
that it is not analogous to, say, passing to the limit of a sequence of polygons and obtaining
a circle. The linguistic similarity is highly misleading, although it does form the working
basis for the typical sloppy undergraduate way of thinking of statistical physics. In this
sense, then, this paper offers a validation of Aristotle’s insight. Probability is a linguistic
phenomenon that arises when we wish to discuss the interaction, as in Brownian motion,
between two systems which cannot be subsumed under a common overarching framework
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of the same dynamical type as each of them separately.
The ignorance interpretation of probability has never been satisfactorily interpreted in
the (above mentioned) framework of logic. Naturally enough, for it is observer dependent
and not linguistically based. It is not a feature of language. The interpretation we will put
forward is linguistic, although contextual: It depends not only on the explicit proposition,
but a model (which is a set of propositions). The ignorance theory also does not allow
for real randomness, and so is rejected by Quantum Mechanics. Our theory will allow
the expression of real randomness—as an approximation to a deterministic reality. No
logical theory can very satisfactorily allow real randomness—as a very matter of reference,
because of the following objection.
Suppose the logic allows assertions q such as ‘p has probability 1
2
,’ p being a physical
event. What of the meta-language? The suggestion that there are meta-propositions about
q which are random is evidently absurd. But the resulting inhomogeneity between a prob-
abilistic logic governed by a fully classical meta-logic is rather unsatisfactory. The natural
conclusion would be that the stochasticness of the logic is generated by the physicality of
(some of) its objects. But this would leave the logic without any role in coming to grips
with the stochasticness.
For this reason, indeed, Kolmogoroff has been able to show that the mathematical
structure of probability theory is completely ordinary and can be reduced to (classical)
mathematical logic (say, Principia Mathematica). Of course it is understood by all that
the mathematical definition of probability is merely a synonym, and not a philosophical
definition of probability.
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Since our proposed interpretation of probability propositions can account for the ap-
parent stochasticness of reality, it would seem, then, that there is no need for stochasticness
in the logic to be generated by physics. This justifies the superficial observation that a
probability proposition must still, after all, be a certain assertion of its meaning. Before
proceeding, it is important to stress that the probabilities of classical statistical mechanics
do not arise out of ignorance, hidden variables, or coarse-graining and that these concepts
are not mentioned at all in this paper. Hence, the meaning of probability has nothing to
do with these sloppy undergraduate ways of approaching thermodynamics.
Our thesis is that the concept of probability is an artifact of a certain approximation
procedure. It is thus neither linguistic (or logical) nor physical. It is only mathematical.
We must begin by discussing the logical structure of statistical mechanics in a way that
does not involve the notion of probability. This structure is now apparent; the belief that it
can be proved vigorously in the imaginable future is current, pace von Mises, even though
this is not accomplished yet.
We discuss the concrete case of classical Brownian motion, for which the rigorous
results are in place. When Einstein gave such an impetus to the theory of Brownian
motion, it was conceived classically, so we flesh out a Newtonian picture for our discussion.
Suppose that in a closed region (with reflective walls) we have n small billiard balls and
one large sphere, much larger than the balls. Call this dynamical system Xn and its phase
space Vn of all possible positions and velocities of all the balls and the sphere. Then Vn
is 6(n + 1)-dimensional. For a fixed total energy of Xn only a hypersurface En ⊂ Vn is
relevant.
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The problem is to describe the motion of the sphere, Sn. To make this well defined,
one must specify the initial conditions of Xn at time t = 0, call this point in En, v0.
Then let X(t, v0) be the resulting path of Sn in the system Xn with initial conditions v0,
regarded as a function of t for fixed v0. It is impractical to solve this problem exactly.
Nevertheless, this is a deterministic problem, so for each v0, X(t, v0) is a function of t.
The set {X(t, v0)|v0 ∈ En} is called the space of “sample paths.” It is a set of functions.
Since each function has the physical interpretation of a “path,” it can be interpreted as a
set of paths.
The procedure of Einstein and Wiener was rather to obtain an approximate solution
to this problem, valid if n is very large. Wiener constructed a different space, W =
{X(t, α)}−∞<t<∞, 0≤α≤1 the Wiener process. For fixed α, X(t, α) is a continuous function
(such that X(0) = 0, as can be assumed). Every such continuous function arises as an
X(t, α) for some α. We put Euclidean (Lebesgue) measure on the interval 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 and
transfer this toW , soW becomes a probability space in the sense of Kolmogoroff. (Wiener
showed that as such, the X(t, α) satisfied the properties of Einstein’s model—Einstein had
treated it postulationally, not constructively.)
The intuitive way people think about this is (illogical—we will soon replace it with a
rather different way) as follows. The α parameter is thought of a analogous to v0. The W
is the limit of Vn as n approaches infinity (‘in the thermodynamic limit’—i.e., the energy
and pressure are held constant so the mass of each billiard ball shrinks proportionately).
For each v0, X(t, v0) is differentiable almost everywhere in t. (I.e., everywhere except at
collisions with the balls.) But as we imagine the billiard balls to get smaller but more
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numerous, the collisions are more frequent. So, corners or kinks (of non-differentiability)
in the path become more frequent. In the limit, they are almost everywhere. Thus, almost
all the X(t, α) are (continuous but) non-differentiable almost everywhere in t.
Now in the limit-model, the stochastic model, physicists tend to think intuitively of
each sample path (i.e., each X(t, α) for fixed α) as the motion of a sphere under “random
impacts” from the surrounding medium—this was Einstein’s view.
The thesis of this paper is rather that the probabilistic aspects are purely artifacts of
W . Now W only has validity as a mathematical approximation device for studying certain
aspects of Vn when n if very large.
1 It is only Vn that is a positivistic model of physical
reality in the sense that there is a correspondence between objects of Vn and physical
objects, between relations (or structures, such as functional dependence) in Vn (between
objects of Vn) and physical relations between physical objects. The modelW is only about
reality indirectly: it is ‘about’ Vn which is about reality. (Strictly speaking, it is not even
about Vn: arguably, it is not really a model, since it is not about anything.)
Some questions that can be asked about Vn can be approximately answered by study-
ing W—the physical question of Einstein’s original series of papers, for example. Other
features of Vn are not preserved by the limiting process and so are not present in W . For
example, Vn satisfies Poincare recurrence for each n. But W does not. A rigorous treat-
ment of this approximation procedure is still lacking in general statistical mechanics. It
1 Cf. Wiener, “Logique, Probabilite et Methode Des Sciences Physiques,” Toutes les lois
de probabilite connues sont de caractere asymptotique . . . les considerations asymptotiques
n’ont d’autre but dans la Science que de permettre de connaitre les proprietes des ensembles
tres nombreux en evitant de voir ces proprietes s’evanouir dans la confusion resultant de
las specificite de leur infinitude. L’infini permet ainsi de considere des nombres tres grands
sans avoir a tenir compte du fait que ce sont des entites distinctes.” That is, it is a method,
not an object.
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has been done by Ford-Kac-Mazur1 (although not exactly for billiard balls and a sphere,
but rather for phonons and a harmonic oscillator), although a complete characterisation of
all those properties of Vn which smoothly approach a limit property of W is still lacking.
But enough has been done to render unlikely von Mises’s flat statement that a justification
of statistical mechanics is inconceivable.
The following is in its logical, modellic structure, essentially due to Darwin and Fowler.
The details of their proofs were simplified by Kolmogoroff and, independently, Wiener, and
exposited by Khinchine (loc. cit.)
Let P be a propositional function of models such that for all n, Vn is in its domain.
But W need not be. By saying that P can be approximately answered by a study of W we
mean that P is of the form |f | = 0 where f is a function of Vn with values in a metric space
(or, for simplicity, we may assume f is a numerical function) and the proposition Q, “for
every ε > 0 there exists N such that for all n > N we have |f(Vn)| < ε” is equivalent to
a proposition Q′ about W . (The words “study” and “about” are vague, and correlatively
so. The original statement, “P can be approximately answered by a study of W” is not
a formal proposition. If, however, Vn is some sort of function of an additional parameter,
say H, and so is W , then we can ask, for example, that for P independent of H, Q′ should
be also. Similarly if P depends on H only through algebraic operations on f , etc. These
are examples of how to make “study” and “about” have a precise meaning.)
For example, we could take P to be “The average motion of the sphere after ten
seconds (at a fixed energy, etc.) where the average is taken with respect to a (given)
1 Ford, Kac, Mazur: “Statistical Mechanics of Assemblies of Coupled Oscillators, Journ.
Math. Phys. vol. 6 (1965), pp. 504-515.
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weighting of initial conditions v0 ∈ E, is
√
10.” Then Q′ is “
∫ 1
0
X(10, α)w(α) dα is
√
10”
where w depends on the weighting mentioned in P . We can also let E and the relative
sizes of the balls and sphere, etc., vary and obtain families of P and Q′.
Note that the intuitive view of X(t, α) cannot be formalized: Since the Wiener process
is not in fact a dynamical system. Admittedly, X(t, α) satisfies a so-called stochastic
differential equation. But an analysis of the linguistic structure of this reveals its utter
lack of parallelism to Vn, or any Xn(t, v0). This follows: for fixed t, Xt(α) = X(t, α) is
obviously a function of α (with values in a three dimensional space of vectors). And α
has as its domain a probability space. In fact, Xt is what is called a random variable.
The definition of a stochastic differential equation is far removed from that of a differential
equation, but even granting part of the intuitive view (which we need not), which follows,
we still will carry our point.
An ordinary differential equation is thought of as a way of relating a variable at
one point in time to a variable at a neighboring point in time (by means of a limiting
process)—similarly for stochastic differential equations, in particular the one which the
Wiener process {Xt}−∞<t<∞ satisfies. (But this parallel is specious only to those who are
ignoring the fact that a so-called “random variable” is not a variable. A random variable
is an object, but a variable is a linguistic construction (hence it could be an object only
for the meta-language). In particular, a random variable is a measurable function from
a probability space to the real numbers. A random variable can have properties, and a
pair of them can stand in relation to each other—e.g. we can ask if Xt and Xt+1 are
independent or not—which is absurd for variables.)
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Thus, for each instant in time t we have that the position of a sphere is governed by a
random variable, Xt0 , which evolves from the previous random variables {Xt}−∞<t<t0 by
a law analogous (seemingly) to a law of motion. That it is impossible to consistently adopt
this intuitive interpretation is manifest now, since this is incompatible with that part of
the intuitive interpretation which we exposited previously, viz., that for fixed α, the sample
path {X(t, α)}−∞<t<∞ represents the motion of the sphere under “random impacts.” In
the one case, we view X(t, α) with variable (unsaturated), in its dependence on t, {Xt}.
That is, we fill in t first (saturated). In the other case, that of viewing the sample path,
we fill in α first, and then t. These are incompatible. In particular, the sample path is not
a solution to the stochastic differential equation: e.g. every continuous function (satisfying
the initial condition X(0) = 0) is a sample path. So the stochastic differential equation
imposes no conditions at all on the sample paths.
In Vn, au contraire, X(t, v0) is a solution to the equations of motion no matter whether
v0 is fixed or variable. The popular fallacy regarding the Wiener process, exposed above,
has probably arisen through two causes: Firstly, the false parallelism between random vari-
ables and variables, (most physicists have never learned the Peano-Frege-Russell analysis
of variables and quantifiers and still think, with Euler and Cauchy, that there are two types
of real numbers: constant ones, and variable ones), and secondly, an unjustified carryover
of the interpretation of Vn to the model W .
In a sense, of course, the above critique of the naive interpretation of a stochastic
process is essentially the same as the critique of the naive interpretation of a random
variable Y (α). Naively, one thinks of the Y (α) as describing an outcome, its value, that
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is random, i.e. not determined by anything. But of course the linguistic analysis of Y (α)
does not bear this out: its value is a function of α, so after all it is deterministic.
But as long as there was no concrete issue at stake, this critique was never convincing.
The Wiener process is “quite possibly the single most important object in all of modern
probability theory,”1 but also typical of statistical mechanics. The concrete issues discussed
above can be regarded, then, as decisive objections to the naive analysis of a random
variable as well as of probabilistic statements.
Some such view as advanced in this paper is necessary in order to make sense of von
Mises’s ensemble or frequency interpretation of probability statements. Von Mises himself,
in referring a probability statement (about a single event), for its meaning, to an (implicit)
statement about an ensemble, is using a structurally similar ‘unpacking’ style of analysis
as we have already advanced. To make his notion rigorous, it is of course necessary to
include an infinite ensemble and a limiting process (as well as a measure), as he practically
does. The only step missing from his analysis, which we supply, is an explicit recognition
of the infinite ensemble (limit)—which is unphysical—as a mathematical approximation
device for making calculations (approximate ones) about a fixed finite stage in the limiting
process. This amendment to von Mises is necessary if one wants to insist that meaningful
propositions are about reality, as long as one thinks that reality is necessarily finite. That
is, talk of potential trials is not able to fit into the framework of Russellian logic. But
on the other hand, in practice we see that the actual trials are always a finite ensemble—
even if not always, our theory has to cover the vast majority of cases where they are
finite. (Naturally, I am not denying that infinite sets are not used in Russellian logic—
1 Stroock, Probability Theory From an Analytic Point of View, Cambridge, 1993, p. xi.
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but they are sets of actual objects, never of potential objects. This is, in fact, just the
same difficulties of random variables all over again. If anyone tried to invent a new logic
with a new kind of variable, an r-variable which in the interpretation was “random” but
linguistically was a variable, how could they talk about an infinite sequence of independent
identically distributed trials? E.g., a Bernoulli process? Objects are distinct because they
have different properties. Random variables are discovered independent—or not, as the
case may be—by comparing their structure as functions of α.)
There is another possible objection that can be made. There is a widespread misim-
pression that the success of Quantum Physics has definitively established stochasticity as
a fundamental feature of science, so that it is perverse to try to explicitly define the notion
of probability in terms of classical logic and classical, deterministic, philosophy of science.
This is not so. There has been a recent flourishing of work on the problem of Quantum
Measurement and the old positivistic consensus has completely broken down. Advances in
Deterministic Chaos and the Gibbs program of statistical mechanics, even in the quantum
context, have opened up the question again, even though hidden variables is not going to
be accepted as the answer. For this reason, it is useful to try the experiment of trying
to account for the probabilities that arise in classical thermodynamics etc. in a logically
careful way. This clears the ground for a re-examination of Einstein’s question, whether
the probabilities of Quantum Mechanics arise in the same sort of way from Schroedinger’s
equation as the probabilities of classical mechanics arise from the Hamilton-Jacobi equa-
tions. Because Einstein himself and most physicists have had a philosophically inadequate
definition of probability and a sloppy undergraduate understanding of the logical structure
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of statistical mechanics. A logically careful account of the classical statistical mechanics
was first adumbrated by Darwin and Fowler in the 1920’s and never penetrated into the
discourse. A logically unexceptionable reductionist account of probability is the accom-
plishment of this paper. This experiment will put Einstein’s question in a completely new
light. Since we do not use ignorance, hidden variables, or coarse-graining at all in our ana-
lytical ‘unpacking’ of the structure of probability assertions, the traditional understanding
of the issues posed by Einstein must be wrong.
Now our analysis of Brownian motion shows the stochastic aspects can arise as an
artifact of the passage from Vn to W . Hence so, then our claim would be practically
justified. That is, assertions as to the probability of an individual event have, not a
physical, but a linguistic meaning. On analysis, they ‘unpack’ as asserting that such and
such an approximation technique yields such and such an answer, and the approximation
is valid—an assertion which may sometimes fall short of the truth—but only for exactly
the same reasons as other approximations break down, and not for any reasons especially
peculiar to the concept of probability. (In particular the failure would not be “random.”)
Our thesis is related to the analysis of counterfactual conditionals. On my view,
a counterfactual conditional is meaningless without a (more or less implicit, in practice)
supplementary dynamical theory of causality, which allows of varied initial conditions (v0).
To assert the conditional is to assert that from v0, the dynamics lead, in theory, to the
consequence.
Our thesis accounts for the probabilistic statements of ordinary language if such im-
plicit theoretical structures can be taken to be part of the shared discourse of the speech-
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act-community in which the statements are made. (If the theories are false, we may as well
suppose the statements are false.) If more than one possible theory could be so regarded,
we have just the typical ambiguities of ordinary language, nothing more.
I should anticipate one plausible objection before concluding. With reference to sta-
tistical physics, the validity of the approximation techniques relies (so far) on the ergodic
theorem. But, letting f represent a dynamic variable or observable of the system, the
ergodic theorem only establishes the validity of the technique for almost all f , i.e. all f
except for a set of measure zero. Does this instantiate a reliance on a concept of probability
which does not fall under our paradigm, but rather the popular one? The popular one
would, that is, interpret “almost all” as meaning “probability one,” thus one is practically
certain that the approximation is valid for the particular observable f under consideration.
It need not. Firstly, the measure space of all f does not, generally, have measure one—
so, technically, it can not be a probability space. Secondly, even if this technical obstacle
could be overcome, f can not be the argument of a random variable. The objection
envisions “validity” as the value of a random variable whose argument would be f . But f
is chosen explicitly by the scientist, so this is clearly not an appropriate model.
Let C be the (algebra) of all f . Let A be the aforesaid set of measure zero and
B = C r A. The situation is rather that at present there is no way to tell whether f ∈ B
except to calculate the predictions of the approximation, perform the experiment, and
compare the two. This is not an unusual situation in science and so we are not tempted
to invoke the popular notion of probability to explain it.
Another misunderstanding to be cleared up, one fostered by the spate of books on
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chaos theory, is that the probabilistic nature enters into the models Vn prior to passage
to the limit. But this is not true. The probabilistic assertions require use of thermody-
namic functions such as temperature—now these are only defined in the limit. Then, too,
physicists, especially those working on the C∗-algebra approach to statistical fallaciously
pass over the distinction between mixed states and states. Not only is this distinction ab-
solutely crucial from a Russell-Wittgenstein point of view, their blurring it is completely
gratuitous when the ergodic theorem is available. For in this case, “phase averages” can
be simply a technical device and need not be given any special physical interpretation.
Now it is time to point out one of the advantages of introducing the passage to the
thermodynamic limit. We need not in fact assume that the dynamics is ergodic. As Khin-
chine shows, the full strength of the ergodic theorem is not necessary in the thermodynamic
limit. That is, there will be a wide class of functions f (only, not necessarily almost all)
for which the phase average is a better and better approximation of the time average, as
one proceeds to the thermodynamic limit1We can obviously interpret ‘probability’ in this
context, mutatis mutandis.
In conclusion, we summarize and exemplify the theses of this paper. We assume it is
well known that popular, traditional treatments of probability, such as reichenbach’s, von
Mises’s or the more implicit (and inchoate) subtext of most physics papers, are linguis-
tically incoherent and essentially irreconcilable with a Russell-Wittgenstein treatment of
logic. (Either because of the Rosencrantz and Guildenstern effect, or because they rely on
probability as a primitive notion.)
But the frequency or ensemble theory itself shows (not unequivocally), and a careful
1 Khintchine, op. cit.,New York, 1949, p. 62f.
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linguistically-corrected recapitulation of classical statistical mechanics shows (much more
clearly)—that probability statements arise as features peculiar to a (concrete) approxima-
tion device, without a physical objective correlative. Thus “probability” has no (direct)
correlative.
For example, suppose VN is a classical dynamical system, and f an observable. The
object is to calculate the time average of f over a long but finite time interval. Instead of
this, we calculate the infinite length time average < f >. We hope that this will be a good
approximation to our real object. The dynamics of VN determines the measure we will use
implicitly in what follows, so we do not, in any sense, interpret the invariant measure dµ
on phase space as a probability. We then hope that the initial conditions, v0, of the actual
system studied and f are such that the ergodic theorem applies, saying < f > is equal to
the phase average of f ,
∫
f dµ.
But we cannot calculate
∫
f dµ, so we use an approximate technique. We embed
VN and f into a sequence of dynamical systems Vn and observables fn, possessing a
thermodynamic limitW (and fW ). (Note that v0 has disappeared.) This has only a logical
status. We cannot interpret W physically, or intuitively as a limit of the Vn. Firstly, it is
not a dynamic system at all. Secondly, although there is a sense in which f can be made
variable with n, there is no sense in which v0 can be. Now since W is stochastic whereas
Vn are deterministic, this is where probabilities enter into the activity of the scientist, the
model-builder and analyst.
Then it is a fact that
∫
fn dµn converges to a limit which can be calculated by means
of W . As explained in the introduction to Ford-Kac-Mazur, the classical program of
20
statistical mechanics ever since Gibbs has been to establish this fact as a theorem, as
is happening in a growing number of special cases, such as those by Ford-Kac-Mazur,
Hudson-Parthasarathy, Lewis-Maassen,1 and many others.
The thesis of this paper is that the analytic interpretation, of unpacking, of these
probability statements is preferable to the naive alternative, to mythologically attribute
physical reality to each and every mathematical manipulation.
A theory of the meaning of probability statements with many similarities to the present
one was put forth by Jan von Plato,2 but for some reason not included in his Creating
Modern Probability, Cambridge, 1994. The main difference, unfortunately for philosophical
purposes this is crucial, is that he defines probability as meaning the time average of a
functional. Whereas we, following the explicit statement of Wiener3 (who was a logician),
1 Lewis, Maassen, “Hamiltonian Models of Classical and Quantum Stochastic Pro-
cesses,” Lecture Notes in Mathematics, Berlin, 1984, vol. 1055, pp. 247-276
2 op. cit.
3 Masani, Wiener, “Non-linear Prediction,” in Probability and Statistics, The Harald
Cramer Volume, ed. U. Grenander, Stockholm, 1959, p. 197: “As indicated by von Neu-
mann . . . in measuring a macroscopic quantity x associated with a physical or biological
mechanism . . . each reading of x is actually the average over a time-interval T which may
appear short from a macroscopoic viewpoint, but it is large microscopically speaking. That
the limit x, as T →∞, of such an average exists, and in ergodic cases is independent of the
microscopic state, is the content of the continuous-parameter L2-Ergodic Theorem. The
error involved in practice in not taking the limit is naturally to be construed as a statistical
dispersion centered about x.” Cf. also Khintchine, op. cit., p. 44f., “an observation which
gives the measurement of a physical quantity is performed not instantaneously, but requires
a certain interval of time which, no matter how small it appears to us, would, as a rule, be
very large from the point of view of an observer who watches the evolution of our phys-
ical system. . . . Thus we will have to compare experimental data . . . with time averages
taken over very large intervals of time.” And not the instantaneous value or instantaneous
state. Wiener, as quoted in Heims, op. cit., p. 138f., “every observation . . . takes some
finite time, thereby introducing uncertainty.” The finiteness operates in two distinct ways.
Since it is not instantaneous, it introduces time-averages. This brings us into the realm
of the ergodic theorem, statistical mechanics, and hence probability. Since it is not infi-
nite, there is some error involved in replacing it by infinite-duration time averages. And
Benatti, Deterministic Chaos in Infinite Quantum Sustems, Berlin, 1993, “Trieste Notes
in Physics,” p. 3, “Since characteristic times of measuring processes on macrosystems are
greatly longer than those governing the underlying micro-phenomena, it is reasonable to
think of the results of a measuring procedure as of time-averages evaluated along phase-
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interpret the time average of a functional as ‘measurement.’ Professor von Plato attributes
his definition to Einstein but this must be a mistake. Einstein’s statement to that effect
in his early papers is not to be taken literally as a piece of philosophy, it is evidently
merely a physicist’s Ansatz in order to fudge various irrelevant difficulties and make room
for progress on one difficulty at a time. Einstein was not a logician, and his path-breaking
work on statistical mechanics preceded by several decades Darwin’s rigourous solution of
the difficulties which Einstein wished to push to one side by means of this Ansatz.
Finally we remark that the structural ‘jumps’ in our unpacking correspond very well
to the naive scientist’s idea of the meaning of probability, and this is evidence in favour
of our proposal. For example, Kolmogoroff, loc. cit., analysed the frequency theory of
probability as being of rough practical value nevertheless, in spite of the fact that it could
not give a reduction of the concept of probability to other concepts. The first feature of
this to be noted is that the frequency “predicted” is merely asserted to be close to what
will happen, where close is a vague notion. In our structural unpacking, this corresponds
to two features: firstly, measurements are in practice always finite, whereas the ergodic
theorem only holds exactly for infinite time averages. Modelling measurements by very
large time averages is exact, but the approximation procedure replaces them by infinite
time averages, and this introduces as an approximative vagueness the vagueness which
Kolmogoroff thought must be due to the primitive, undefinability of probability. Wiener
has also remarked explicitly on the importance of the fact that all our measurements or
observations are of finite time intervals, not infinite ones, and the unavoidable imprecision
trajectories corresponding to given initial conditions.”(underscoring in the original). And
Pauli, Pauli Lectures on Physics, volume 4, Statistical Mechanics, Cambridge, Mass., 1973,
p. 28f., “What is observed macroscopically are time averages . . . ”
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this introduces into our predictions. But our proposal makes it clear that this vagueness or
imprecision is not a logical one, but merely of the same epistemological category, whatever
that is, of traditional approximate measurements in classical mechanics. Secondly, the
ergodic theorem holds only for almost all initial conditions. There is an exceptional set of
measure zero. Now for finite observations, time-averages over finite time intervals, the set
of initial conditions or trajectories for which the observed value differs appreciably from
the phase average (predicted value) is actually of positive measure: it shrinks to measure
zero only in the limit of infinite time averages. So this is the second source of imprecision:
the exceptional set has positive measure. Our proposal removes this imprecision from
the philosophical realm of probability because of the extra layer of indirection we have
added, when compared to the naive frequency theory. The statement that the probability
of observing the event is x remains true even when the actual observation turns out to
belong to or be close to the exceptional set and so leads to a measurement that differs
appreciably from the probabilistic expectation. Because, according to our proposal, the
statement was not directly about the observation, but was about the modelling procedure
leading us to predict the expectation, and was thus about a whole statistical ensemble of
counter-factual conditionals besides the actual realised observation. It thus remains true
no matter which conditional is realised.
The second roughness in the naive view has to do with the insufficiently formalised
notion of what is meant physically by saying that the trials are independent. This cor-
responds to the following fold in our unpacking proposal: we interpret the making of a
probability assertion as implicitly making assertions that there is an underlying dynamics
to determine the event and that this dynamics has various properties (either ergodicity,
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which, by the way, is usual in quantum dynamics and easier to establish there than classi-
cally, or some sort of large-number condition which is sufficient for the truth of the result
of the ergodic theorem even when ergodicity is lacking).
Finally, we point out that the third roughness in the usual view, again, rather acutely
formulated by Kolmogoroff, is that even if one sneaky observer somehow gathered enough
initial conditions data about the coin toss to be able to predict it, we would somehow want
to still say that its probability was objectively or subjectively one-half when the event
occurs in the context of a specification or description that leaves this extra knowledge
out of account. This is accomplished by the proposal of this paper in the same way as
the explanation of the meaning of independence of trials, above. That is, the probability
assertion is taken by us as implicitly including a specification of the entire phase space
of the system, including its Liouville measure, indeed, the phase spaces of each member
Vn of an infinite sequence of dynamical systems. The statement then being about this
sequence, the meaning is left intact even if we in fact all knew the exact initial condition
v0 which obtained. The meaning is clear-cut and logical, its connection with observations
and scientific practice is formulatable in precise terms, and yet the imprecisions we are used
to are preserved in the harmless form which they have in many other places in classical
epistemology, quite apart from notions of probability.
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